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After finishing the book, the reader certainly feels that Hogan has accomplished his task of allowing Benjamin Peirce
to tell his own life story.
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Axiomatik und Empirie. Eine wissenschaftstheoriegeschichtliche Untersuchung zur Mathematischen
Naturphilosophie von Newton bis Neumann (Axiomatics and empiricism. An investigation from the point
of view of the history of the theory of science of mathematical natural philosophy from Newton through
Neumann)
By Helmut Pulte. Darmstadt (Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft). 2005. ISBN 3-534-15894-6. 502 pp. No price
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Mechanics is a mathematical and a physical discipline. Its history is therefore a subject that should appeal to
both historians of mathematics and historians of the physical sciences. However, as Pulte points out, it has received
too little attention from both camps. Historians of mathematics have paid some attention to the development of the
mathematical formalism of mechanics and physicists have dealt with the subject as the foundation of physical science.
Pulte’s book analyses the philosophical status and foundations of the developing science of mechanics. It is a deep,
original, and important contribution to our understanding of both the history of mechanics and the foundations of the
mathematical and physical sciences as a whole from 1600 up to 1900.
When classical physics was challenged during the early 20th century the crisis led to a thorough change in its prin-
ciples. This was made possible by an already established awareness that the principles of mechanics (and geometry)
were alterable. Pulte’s book deals with the process that led to this awareness. He argues that this process was not pri-
marily (if at all) driven by empirical problems, but by a critique from above, i.e. by a philosophical and mathematical
analysis of the basic principles. He rejects the view that mathematical physics was hypothetico-deductive from the
time of Newton on. Instead, he argues that until the early 19th century the basic principles of mechanics were not
considered hypotheses, but rather necessary and certain axioms. Only with Jacobi this philosophical conviction was
abandoned in favor of a conventionalist or hypothetical view of the principles. Pulte’s book is a thorough argument
for this thesis. But it is much more. It is a wide ranging history of the theory of mechanics and thereby of the theory
of physics. Pulte has been occupied with this subject for two decades. His book can be considered the ripe fruit of his
research.
The book is about what the author calls “Wissenschaftstheoriegeschichte” (history of the theory of science). It is
mainly based on a close reading of the works of working scientists, their philosophical reflections as well as their
more technical mathematical theories and deductions. It is a history of philosophy of mechanical practice. Pulte also
takes the views of what he calls school philosophers into account, but only the views of two philosophers, Kant
and Fries, are analyzed in some detail. He has chosen to discuss these two philosophers because their philosophical
ideas were informed by science, and because they contributed to the dissolution of the classical axiomatic view of
natural philosophy. Otherwise the major players in the book are Newton, Euler, Lagrange, Jacobi, Riemann and Carl
Neumann.
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Pulte takes the mathematical technicalities of mechanics very seriously, but his book is not primarily devoted to a
detailed explanation or analysis of the mathematical deductive structures of the past or the mathematical techniques
applied in these deductions. The only thorough mathematical analysis of a technical deduction is the analysis of Jaco-
bi’s refutation of Lagrange’s “proof” of the principle of virtual velocity. This plays a central role in Pulte’s argument
and has been overlooked until Pulte called attention to it. Otherwise the mathematical details are not explicitly spelled
out. This poses no problem for a reader with a moderate knowledge of (the history of) mechanics.
This is a German book at least in two respects. It has a clear and acknowledged bias toward the German perspective,
and it is written in German. Newton and Lagrange figure prominently in the book and the views of d’Alembert,
Hamilton and other non-Germans are discussed in some detail but toward the end of the book the German scene is
at the focus. This is justified because Pulte persuasively argues that the demolition of the axiomatic Euclideanism
in mechanics was primarily a German enterprise. That the book is written in German is a challenge for those of us
who have only a moderate command of this language. It is written in a scholarly and somewhat convoluted style
characteristic of philosophers who strive for absolute precision. Long sentences and words abound. However the
content is reward enough for the effort required of non-German readers.
The book can roughly be divided into three parts. In chapters I and II Pulte clarifies his meta-theoretical and
meta-historical take on the classical and the modern concept of science. Then, in chapters III and IV he sets forth
the foundation of mechanics according to Newton, his contemporaries, and their 18th century followers. Finally, in
chapters V to VII he explains how this classical view was replaced by the modern hypothetico-deductive point of view.
By a classical deductive science Pulte understands a science whose results are deduced from axioms (principles or
laws) that are considered certain and necessary, and at the same time true of nature. He also uses the term Euclideanism
to denote this fundamentalist and essentialist view of science. In a modern hypothetico-deductive science the principles
at the basis of the deductions are considered hypotheses or conventions that are not necessarily true of nature and could
be replaced by other principles.
In chapter III of the book Pulte gives a thorough analysis of Newton’s views concerning the foundation of mechan-
ics, in particular in the Principia. He concludes that contrary to the view of many historians and philosophers, Newton
did not introduce the modern hypothetico-deductive paradigm in science, but worked squarely within the classical
paradigm. Newton agreed with the Baconians, that our knowledge about nature has an empiric origin, but contrary to
them he believed that from our experience of nature we (or at least Newton) could inductively deduce laws of motion
or axioms, that are certain and necessary. For Newton these principles have a status similar to the axioms of geometry.
In chapter IV Pulte argues that this view of the foundation of mechanics continued through the 18th century. In many
other ways the science of mechanics underwent fundamental changes incompatible with what its development as a
normal scientific activity in a pre-established Newtonian paradigm should be. As Pulte points out the development
integrated Newtonian, Cartesian and Leibnizian elements in a fundamentally novel analytic formulation of mechanics
and introduced a host of new mechanical principles. In the first half of the century some continental mathematicians
such as Euler and Maupertuis gave metaphysical arguments for the necessary truth of the principles, but gradually
such arguments were mistrusted. In particular the principle of least action was at first supported by teleological ar-
guments, but was later considered as a very general and mathematically economic way to formulate the foundation
of mechanics. In general, metaphysical discussions of the nature of the basic principles gave way to a mathematical
discussion about how one could best chose one or a few of the many principles as basic axioms that could support
the deductive building of mechanics. In a way one can consider Lagrange’s Mécanique Analytique as the culmination
of the classical view of mechanics. In particular its second edition is close to this ideal because Lagrange here tried
to prove his basic principle, namely the principle of virtual velocities. Still Pulte argues that mechanics around 1800
contained the seeds of the problems that eventually destroyed the classical view: Though the basic principles were
still considered necessary and true, they were no longer evident, intuitive, essential or unique, and the terms had lost
a lot of their original meaning. Pulte, following Lakatos, speaks of rubber Euclideanism.
As an introduction to the final overturning of the classical Euclidean view of mechanics Pulte analyses Kan-
t’s and Fries’s critique of teleology and Fries’s critique of Kant’s attempt to rescue the necessity of the principles
(chapter V). Chapter VI is probably the most innovative and original chapter of the book. Here Pulte demonstrates
Jacobi’s central role in the modern reinterpretation of the principles of mechanics and the resulting development of the
hypothetico-deductive method in science. Moreover, he argues for the role played by the new emerging conception
of pure mathematics for this radical change. Until recently our knowledge of Jacobi’s view of mechanics has rested
solely on his published papers and the notes from his lecture of 1842/43 on dynamics. They bear evidence to a pure
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mathematician’s contribution to the integration of the differential equations of mechanics. However, recently Pulte
has published Scheibner’s notes form Jacobi’s last lecture on the subject, dating from 1847/48. They include a long
and deep discussion of the nature of the principles of mechanics. In particular Jacobi engaged in a critical analysis
of Lagrange’s attempted proofs of the principle of virtual velocities, and concluded that one cannot establish the nec-
essary truth of the principles of mechanics neither by metaphysical nor by mathematical means. They are, according
to Jacobi, conventions. Pulte convincingly argues that this change in the status of the principles of mechanics was
conditioned by the development of a new view of mathematics as a pure intellectual creation. This view and the ac-
companying distinction between pure and applied mathematics was a creation of early 19th-century Germany, and
Jacobi was one of its most outspoken advocates. It created the problem of the applicability of mathematics: How is it
possible that a pure creation of the mind can say something about nature? In his early years Jacobi attributed this possi-
bility to a pre-established harmony between our intellect and nature. The distinction also forced him to decide whether
to deal with mechanics as a pure or an applied discipline. At first he mostly dealt with it as a purely mathematical dis-
cipline whose goal was to integrate the equations of motion. In the last course however, he presented mechanics as an
applied discipline, and he gave up the appeal to the harmony between intellect and nature. Jacobi’s lectures created the
distinction between principles of mechanics viewed as laws of motion and viewed as axioms in a deductive system. If
mechanics is considered a pure mathematical discipline, the axioms are the given foundations of the deductive system.
However, if it is considered an applied discipline dealing with the world around us, the principles are according to
Jacobi conventions not only because we can chose among a great many principles as the basis of mechanics, but also
because their truth is no longer necessary. In fact Jacobi maintained that the conventions were fallible. In this respect
he went further than Poincaré did 50 years later in his better known formulation of conventionalism.
Though Jacobi’s modern views on the foundation of mechanics have been neglected by modern historians, they
were well-known among his contemporaries and successors and strongly influenced Riemann and Carl Neumann.
This is convincingly established in chapters VII and VIII, concerned with the new and original ideas of these two
scientists. Although they (regrettably, according to Pulte) used the term “hypothesis” rather than “convention”, they
developed and even radicalized Jacobi’s conventionalist views. For example Neumann argued that it makes no sense
to say that the principles of mechanics are true or false, probable or improbable, since one cannot conclude backwards
from the validity of their consequences. The last short chapter deals with the period just before Einstein and serves as
a conclusion to the book. While Pulte does not deal in any detail with Mach’s influential critique of the foundations
of mechanics, yet this is justified because Mach’s contribution is much more well-known than the works of Jacobi,
Riemann and Neumann.
Pulte’s discussion of the “hypothetization” of the principles of mechanics sheds a particularly interesting light on
the general history of the conception of the axiomatico-deductive method. We are used to tell the story of how the
emergence of non-Euclidean geometry led to a new view of the axioms (and eventually also the objects) of geometry.
The axioms, which had from antiquity been considered as evident truths, were reinterpreted as (arbitrary) starting
points of our deductions whose applicability to nature was an empirical question or a matter of convention. Pulte’s
book reveals a parallel and independent development within mechanics. He points out that the changes in mechanics
predated the changes in geometry and argues that during the 1850s and 1860s mechanics influenced geometry. In
particular he argues that Riemann’s reflections on mechanics and other parts of physics had an influence on his
Habilitationsvortrag about the hypotheses at the basis of geometry. I will recommend this book to all historians
and philosophers of mathematics and physics who are interested in the fundamental changes that took place in the
foundation of mechanics in the period between Newton and Neumann.
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